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Recent Decisions
Criminal Law - Durham Sanity Test Rejected. State
v. Lucas, ........ N.J ......... 152 A. 2d 50 (N.J., 1959). Adhering
to the traditional M'Naghten Rule, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of defendant arsonist
who set fire to a church rectory causing death of its three
occupants. After conflicting testimouy by four prominent
psychiatrists, the defendant's requested jury instructions
framed similar to the Durham test of legal insanity were
denied. On appeal the Court upheld this denial, clearly
stating it did not feel bound by precedent but "[Ulntil
such time as we are convinced by firm foundation in scientific fact that a test... other than M'Naghten will serve
the basic end of our jurisprudence ... we shall adhere to
it ..... " (68).
Thus the Durham "product" test, first developed in
Durham v. U. S., 214 F. 2d 862, 45 A.L.R. 2d 430 (1954)
and recently rephrased in Carter v. U. S., 252 F. 2d 608
(D.C. Cir., 1957), which gained some ground by its statutory adoption in the Virgin Islands in 1957 (V.I. Code,
Title 14, Section 14, 1957), suffered a setback at the hands
of the New Jersey Court.
The instant case in citing Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565,
115 A. 2d 502 (1955) recognizes that Maryland has also
emphatically stated, "[Wle will not change the right and
wrong test unless we are convinced that it is not the proper
test.". Although most courts remain unconvinced, prominent jurists such as Cardozo, Frankfurter, Sobeloff and
Thomsen (supra, p. 271) have recommended the abandonment of the M'Naghten test. See 15 Md. L. Rev. 93, 15
Md. L. Rev. 44.
Evidence - Credibility Of Dope Addict's Testimony
Not A Proper Subject For An Expert Witness. People v.
Williams . ....... N. ......... , 159 N.E. 2d 549 (1959). Defendant dope peddler was convicted primarily as a result of
the testimony of a dope addict. On lower court's refusal
to allow defendant to show by an expert witness the effect
of narcotic addiction upon the veracity of addicts, defendant appealed. The New York Court of Appeals held that
until it is clearly and convincingly demonstrated to the
full satisfaction of the Court that there is a consensus
of scientific and medical opinion to the effect that narcotic
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addicts of the same type as the witness in this case are
unworthy of belief and are pathological liars, the Court
will not allow individual experts to give their opinion on
veracity or credibility of such persons as a class, emphasizing that to permit this was to raise a "collateral" issue
with insufficient basis in scientific knowledge to permit it.
Two dissenting Justices felt that "anything" having a tendency to show the accuracy, truthfulness and sincerity of a
witness should be accepted in evidence. They quickly disposed of the "collateral issue" and "scientific consensus"
arguments of the majority, answering the first by necessity; the second by citing State v. Fong Loon, 29 Ida. 248,
158 P. 233 (1916), an extreme case in this area. Therein
the Court admitted expert testimony that flatly labeled
dope addicts as pathological liars living in an, unreal dream
state. Also, in the State of Washington, it has been held
that the defense is entitled to prove by expert testimony
the effect of the drug upon the mind and memory of the
user, State v. Smith, 103 Wash. 267, 174 P. 9 (1918), and
further that "the habitual use of opium ... is known to
utterly deprave the victim of its use, and render him unworthy of belief.", State v. Concannon, 25 Wash. 327, 65
P. 534, 537 (1901).
A number of states have followed, to some extent, the
Fong Loon theory: State v. Smith, supra, Beland v. State,
86 Tex. Cr. 285, 217 S.W. 147 (1920), Effinger v. Effinger,
48 Nev. 205, 239 P. 801 (1925), State v. Prentice, 192 Ia.
207, 183 N.W. 411 (1921). See also 3 WiGMoRE ON EVmENCE,
(3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 934; Rossman, Testimony of a Drug
Addict, 58 Amer. L. Rev. 196 (1924); and Comment, Hale,
Evidence - Witnesses - Narcotics as Affecting Credibility, 16 S. Cal. L. Rev. 333 (1942).
The Maryland Courts have not had occasion to deal
with this specific problem but when dealing with expert
testimony, in general, they have adopted a cautious attitude, admitting such evidence only when necessary and
when it is likely to be of definite value. Wimpling v. State,
171 Md. 362, 189 A. 248 (1936), Wilson v. State, 181 Md.
1, 26 A. 2d 770 (1942), Casualty Ins. Co. v. Messenger,
181 Md. 295, 29 A. 2d 653 (1942).
Libel And Slander - Broadcaster Immune From Liability For Libelous Statements Made By A Political Candidate. Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v.
W.D.A.Y. Inc.. ........ U.S ......... 79 S. Ct. 1302 (1959). The petitioner cooperative union brought suit against the respon-
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dent television station for concededly libelous statements
made by a political candidate over the facilities of the respondent. The United States Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Black, in affirming the North Dakota Supreme Court,
held that the Communications Act of 1934, Sec. 315(a),
as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. (1952) Sec. 315(a), which compels
broadcasters to afford legally qualified political candidates
equal time to that granted to other candidates for the same
office, and prohibits any previous censorship of the broadcast, carries with it a federal immunity for the broadcast
station from liability for libelous statements so broadcast.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined in dissent by Justices
Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart, reasoned that state libel
laws should not be supplanted by federal statute in absence
of a clear mandate from the Congress, and that here there
was no such mandate; for, while the original version of
the bill in Congress which became Sec. 315(a) contained
an immunity clause, the final version did not.
Despite this sharp division of the Supreme Court in its
initial construction of Sec. 315(a) in this precise situation,
the decision relieves broadcasters of a dilemma caused
by previous state and Federal Communications Commission decisions. Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 234 N.W.
82, 82 A.L.R. 1098 (1932), had held that a broadcaster may
be held liable for defamation, and therefore is only prohibited from censoring statements for their "political and
partisan trend". In Re Port Huron Broadcasting Co., 12
F.C.C. 1069 (1948) held that the prohibition against censorship was absolute, including even libelous statements (and
see federal cases collected in 79 S. Ct. Rep. 1304, n. 3), without any authoritative indication that the Act grants immunity. Thus, the broadcaster was caught in the awkward
position of risking loss of his license under the Port Huron
doctrine if he censored a candidate's material, or possible
liability for defamation under the doctrine of the Sorensen
case if he failed to censor. The instant case resolves the
conflict by construing the censorship prohibition as being
absolute but carrying with it by necessary implication an
absolute immunity from liability for defamation. For divergent views on the North Dakota Court's decision below,
see 37 Tex. L. Rev. 114 (1958) and 32 So. Cal. L. Rev. 71
(1958).

Since 1952, a Maryland Statute

(MD. CODE

1957, Art. 75,

Sec. 6) has provided an immunity for the broadcaster for
statements of candidates for public office concerning any
opponent for the same office, but assessing liability as to
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statements concerning others (including punitive damages
upon proof of malice on the part of the broadcaster).
Quaere: To what extent is this Maryland Statute superseded, under doctrines of federal preemption, by the federal immunity established by the instant construction of
the Communications Act (See the instant case, 79 S. Ct.
1308, n. 19, dis. op., pp. 1312, n. 6, 1313, 1314)?
Municipal Corporations - Liability Of Municipality
For Appointing Incompetent Agent. McAndrew v. Mularchuk, ........ N.J......... , 152 A. 2d 372 (1959). Defendant, a
"reserve" policeman employed by defendant municipality,
was specially assigned to patrol an area at the request of
a night club proprietor. Defendant was to be paid by the
proprietor for such duty. Plaintiff was involved in an
altercation that had erupted near the club and was shot
in the back by defendant during an ensuing chase. Plaintiff recovered against the policeman, but his claim against
the municipality was dismissed and he appealed.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
would not grant relief on the theory of respondeatsuperior
since there was no evidence that defendant municipality
participated directly in the act of shooting. The Court held,
however, in reversing and remanding the case, that the
jury could have found that the Chief of Police whose act,
on account of his position, might be regarded as the act
of the municipality, was negligent in appointing and assigning defendant to police duties, armed with a revolver, in
view of defendant's inadequate training and ability, and
that such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's
wound, and rendered the municipality liable.
Although Maryland has never had occasion to consider
this theory, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly ruled that
one cannot recover from a municipal corporation for injuries sustained as a result of its negligence or nonfeasance
in the exercise of governmental, as opposed to private or
proprietary, functions, Wynkoop v. Hagerstown, 159 Md.
194, 150 A. 447 (1930), Baltimore v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128,
173 A. 56 (1934), Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 195 A.
571 (1937). In Wynkoop v. Hagerstown, the Court stated
that police officers, exercising directly the police power of
the state, are governmental agents, not municipal agents
or servants, and the municipalities will not be responsible
for their acts or omissions as police officers. See 3 Md.
L. Rev. 159, 164 (1939). The New Jersey Court would
permit the municipal corporation to be held liable even
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though the reserve policeman was operating in a governmental capacity if someone sufficiently high in the municipal authority participates in the tort; and, here, the
police chief, in allowing the defendant to act as a reserve
policeman, was such a participant. Cf. Johnson v. City of
Jackson, ........ Tenn ......... , 250 S.W. 2d 1, 3 (1952) contra
to the New Jersey case.
In the State of New York, where immunity has been
waived (Court of Claims Act, Sec. 8, L. 1939, Ch. 860), it
was held that a city could be liable where the Police Commissioner was negligent in allowing an incompetent policeman to remain on the force, policeman having shot the
plaintiff, McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71
N.E. 2d 419 (1947). See also Peters v. Bellinger, ........ Ill.
A. 2d ......... 159 N.E. 2d 528 (1959); McQUILIN, MUNICIPAL
ComtPoRAnoNs (3d Ed. 1950), Vol. 18, Secs. 53.78-53.80;
III DAvis, AWIxNIsTRATivE LAw (12th Ed. 1958), Secs.
25.07, 25.17.
Taxation - Continued Receipt Of Rents By Grantor
Subjects Transferred Realty To Estate Tax. McNichol's
Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 265 F. 2d 667
(C.C.A. 3d 1959). Decedent gratuitously conveyed certain
income producing real estate to his children nine years
before his death in 1951. Pursuant to an oral understanding with the grantees, decedent continued to receive the
rents from these properties until his death, although the
deeds did not state that any income or interest in the land
had been reserved by him. In his federal income tax returns, decedent reported the rents as his personal income.
The Tax Court held that the properties were includable
in the decedent's gross estate under sec. 811 (c), (1), (B)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which provided
that property which has been transferred inter vivos is includable in the gross estate of a decedent when he had
retained for his life the possession or enjoyment of, or the
right to, the income from the property. In affirming, the
Court held that the reservation need not be explicitly expressed in the deeds in order for the grantor to "enjoy"
the income from the property, nor need the decedent
have reserved an enforceable claim in order to retain
the "right to the income". Consequently, the state statute
of frauds, prohibiting the enforcement of certain oral agreements, was inapplicable. The Court concluded, despite
petitioners' technical contentions, that the decedent in fact
enjoyed the income from the conveyed property until his
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death, and that petitioners could not avoid the estate tax
since the ultimate possession and enjoyment of the property was not effected until the death of the grantor.
The regulations under the comparable section of the
1954 Code, Reg. 20.2036-1 (a), are in accord, indicating that
a mere understanding, express or implied, at the time of
transfer, that the life interest would be later conferred on
the grantor, is to be treated as a "retention" of the interest
by the grantor.
Taxation - Maryland Ground Rents Not Taxable As
Realized Income On Sale Of Leasehold. Welsh Homes, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. #22 (1959). Taxpayer, a real
estate developer, bought land in fee simple, erected houses
thereon, and created ground rents which he retained upon
sale of the houses and transfer of the leaseholds. The Commissioner contended that the reserved ground rent was
to be treated as a mortgage, and that the capitalized value,
like a mortgage, should be included in determining gain
or loss on the sale. Re-examining and following Commissioner v. Simmers Estate, 231 F. 2d 909 (4th C.C.A.),
noted in 17 Md. L. Rev. 241 (1957), the Tax Court held
that under the peculiar Maryland ground rent system, no
taxable event occurs until the developer disposes of the
ground rent, or the purchaser redeems it. The court also
rejected the Commissioner's alternative argument that the
full amount received by the taxpayer, less depreciation,
was includable in the taxpayer's income as rent, without
a deduction for construction costs. (See "No Gain or Loss
on Maryland Ground Rent not Sold with House", 59 CCH
Standard Fed. Tax Rep., 8725).
Wills - Construction Of "No-Contest" Clause. Kolb v.
Levy, ........ Fla ......... 110 S. 2d 25 (1959). Plaintiff, legatee
under a will which stated that a beneficiary who contested
or aided in contesting any portion of the will would forfeit
the bequest provided for him, filed a complaint for declaratory relief alleging that decedent breached a contract
to make a will in the former's favor. Defendants argued
that the plaintiff forfeited any rights under the will because her attempted enforcement of the alleged contract
amounted to a "contest" of the will. In holding for the
plaintiff, the District Court of Appeal of Florida (3rd
Dist.) stated that "no-contest" clauses, the violation of
which results in forfeiture should be strictly construed.
Here there was no evidence that plaintiff attempted to
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prosecute her claim in bad faith or without reasonable
cause; her actions did not amount to a "contest".
In Black v. Herring, 79 Md. 146, 28 A. 1063 (1894), the
only related Maryland case dealing with such clauses, the
Court of Appeals reasoned that plaintiff did not thwart the
desire of the testatrix or forfeit his right to benefit from
the will by filing a bill in Equity seeking a true construction of the will. See: annotations in 5 A.L.R. 1370, and
49 A.L.R. 2d 205; RoLusoN, WiLLS (1939), 377-383; THOMpSOx, WILLS (3d Ed. 1947) 573-5.

Book Reviews
Modern Criminal Procedure. By Roy Moreland. Indianapolis. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959. Pp. x,
336; with table of treatises, articles and notes, table of
cases, and index. $10.00.
No matter how long he has been practicing, a lawyer
is apt to have a vivid recollection of his first criminal case.
Not necessarily pleasant - but vivid. The drama and the
high stakes involved may help to account for this, but the
newness and strangeness of the task contribute as much
to the powerful and lasting impression made. Such newness and strangeness is in part due to the tendency of
criminal procedure to slip between the cracks of the law
school, curriculum. Treatment of procedural matters in
the course in Criminal Law may be limited to the most
basic matters, with vague promises of more to come.
Teachers of Constitutional Law, Evidence and Civil Procedure often find it comfortable to assume that the student
already knows all about criminal procedure.
Professor Moreland's MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE will
be a good starting point for the law student or puzzled
young practitioner whose legal education in this area leaves
something to be desired. There is very little of single volume length in the field,' and so a treatise as useful as this
one is especially valuable. This is a basic text, most useful
if used as an, orientation device and read from beginning
to end in a few sittings. There is no attempt at exhaustive
1

Valuable single volume works are

AMERTCAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930) ; ORFELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO
APPEAL (1947) ; PERKINS, ELEMENTS OF POLICE SCIENCE (1942).

